The Prut War (1710–1711): Ottoman–Russian Conflict in Eastern Europe

The Prut War (1710–1711), also known as the Prut River Campaign, was a significant but short-lived conflict fought between the Tsardom of Russia, led by Peter the Great, and the Ottoman Empire.

Occurring against the backdrop of the larger Great Northern War (1700-1721), the immediate cause was the Ottoman decision to provide refuge to King Charles XII of Sweden after his defeat by Peter the Great at the Battle of Poltava in 1709. Encouraged by Charles XII and concerned by growing Russian power and expansion towards the Black Sea, the Ottomans declared war on Russia in late 1710.

Historical Background and Causes

The Prut War of 1710–1711 (also known as the Pruth River Campaign) was rooted in the wider context of the Great Northern War and longstanding Ottoman–Russian rivalry. In 1709, during the Great Northern War, Tsar Peter I (Peter the Great) of Russia defeated King Charles XII of Sweden at the Battle of Poltava (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). Charles XII fled with a small retinue into Ottoman territory, finding refuge at Bender in the Ottoman vassal state of Moldavia (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). The Russian Tsar demanded that the Ottoman Sultan Ahmed III expel or surrender the Swedish king, but the Sultan refused despite incessant Russian pressure (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). This diplomatic standoff increased tensions between Russia and the Ottoman Empire.

By late 1710, war became inevitable. Encouraged by Charles XII’s presence and advice, as well as pressure from pro-war advisors (including the Crimean Tatar Khan), Sultan Ahmed III declared war on Russia on 20 November 1710 (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). For the Ottomans, the situation was an opportunity to check Russian expansion and even recover territories lost earlier (such as the fortress of Azov, which Russia had captured in 1696). On the Russian side, Peter the Great sought to eliminate the Ottoman threat to his ongoing war with Sweden by a quick campaign south. In preparation, Peter secured an alliance with the Prince of Moldavia, Dimitrie Cantemir. By the Treaty of Lutsk (April 1711), Cantemir agreed to switch allegiance from the Sultan to the Tsar, providing Russian troops passage and local support in Moldavia (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). This set the stage for a Russian invasion of the Ottoman Balkans, with the aim of leveraging discontent among Ottoman vassals and striking a decisive blow to force the Ottomans into a favorable peace.

Major Political and Military Figures

Russian Tsardom (Muscovy): The Russian war effort was led personally by Tsar Peter I (“Peter the Great”), who commanded the army in the field (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). Peter’s consort, Catherine (future Empress Catherine I) also accompanied the campaign; later folklore credits her with a crucial role in saving the Russian army through diplomacy (see below). Key Russian commanders included Field Marshal Boris Sheremetev, whom Peter tasked with leading part of the army and blocking the Ottoman advance (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia), and General Carl Ewald von Rönne, who led a detachment in Wallachia. Prince Dimitrie Cantemir of Moldavia was a pivotal political ally on the Russian side – as Moldavia’s ruler (Hospodar), he provided troops, provisions, and local knowledge to the Russians, hoping to liberate his principality from Ottoman suzerainty (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). Additionally, Admiral Fyodor Apraksin commanded Russian naval forces in the Black Sea theater (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia), and Cossack hetmans (like Ivan Skoropadsky, loyalist successor to Mazepa) contributed Cossack cavalry units to Peter’s army.

Ottoman Empire: Sultan Ahmed III was the reigning Ottoman monarch who authorized the war. Although the Sultan did not command in person, he delegated leadership to his Grand Vizier, Baltacı Mehmet Pasha, whom he appointed as commander-in-chief (Serdar) of the Ottoman expedition (Baltacı Mehmet Pasha – Wikipedia). Grand Vizier Baltacı Mehmet Pasha was an experienced statesman and took charge of the Ottoman army’s operations; it was he who negotiated with Peter on the Prut. Another critical figure was Devlet II Giray, the Khan of the Crimean Tatars, an Ottoman vassal. Devlet Giray’s Tatar cavalry (numbering tens of thousands) formed the fast-moving advance guard of the Ottoman forces (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia), harassing the Russians and cutting their supply lines. He and Charles XII of Sweden were the leading voices of the “war party” at the Ottoman court, urging a hard line against Russia. In the Danubian Principalities, local rulers played ambiguous roles: Prince Constantin Brâncoveanu of Wallachia remained officially loyal to the Sultan, but he was suspected of secret communications with Peter. Notably, Spatharios Toma Cantacuzino, a Wallachian commander, defected to the Russian side with a contingent of troops during the campaign (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). On the periphery, King Charles XII of Sweden himself, though not an Ottoman subject, was an influential figure – his presence in Ottoman lands and lobbying at the Sultan’s court were a catalyst for the war (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). Charles even accompanied the Ottoman army as an observer, hoping for a decisive Ottoman victory that would force Russia to re-engage on two fronts.

Key Events and Battles of the Prut War

• Ottoman War Declaration and Tatar Raids (1710–1711): War was formally declared by the Ottomans in November 1710, and hostilities commenced in early 1711. The Crimean Tatars under Khan Devlet II Giray launched raids into Russian-held Ukraine during the winter, attempting to destabilize the Russian southern frontier (Moldavian Surprise 1711 – Balkan Military History). Tens of thousands of Tatar horsemen, sometimes accompanied by Swedish-allied Cossack bands, swept into the steppes, though Russian forces managed to repel these incursions and drive the raiders back toward Crimea (Moldavian Surprise 1711 – Balkan Military History). These early operations signaled that the Ottomans would actively use their mobile Tatar cavalry to weaken the enemy before a main confrontation.
• Peter’s Invasion of Moldavia (Spring–Summer 1711): In response, Tsar Peter I mustered a large Russian army (estimated around 80,000 soldiers (Treaty of the Pruth – Wikipedia), including regular infantry, dragoon cavalry, and Cossack auxiliaries) for an offensive into the Balkans. In May 1711, Peter’s army crossed into Moldavia (via modern Ukraine) and rendezvoused with Cantemir’s Moldavian forces – roughly 6,000–10,000 Moldavian troops – near Iași (Jassy), the capital of Moldavia (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia) (Moldavian Surprise 1711 – Balkan Military History). The Moldavian populace, under Cantemir’s leadership, rose in support of the Russians, providing guides and supplies. Peter’s strategic plan was to march south along the Prut River, then cross the Danube River into Ottoman proper territory (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). If successful, this bold move could threaten the Ottoman strongholds in the Balkans and force the Sultan to negotiate on Peter’s terms. However, progress was slow – summer rains and supply shortages delayed the Russians. Moreover, Peter expected the Prince of Wallachia, Brâncoveanu, to join the coalition, but Wallachia hesitated. Brâncoveanu had gathered an army in Wallachia, ostensibly awaiting the conflict’s outcome before choosing a side (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). His indecision meant the Wallachian army never fully cooperated with the Russians, depriving Peter of additional local support (Moldavian Surprise 1711 – Balkan Military History).
• Ottoman Army Mobilization: Meanwhile, the Ottomans mobilized a massive force to meet the Russian incursion. Grand Vizier Baltacı Mehmet Pasha assembled an army of at least 100,000 Ottoman troops (including elite Janissary infantry and heavy cavalry), reinforced by 70,000 Tatar horsemen from Crimea (Moldavian Surprise 1711 – Balkan Military History). This army, one of the largest Ottoman field forces of the early 18th century, marched north from Istanbul and Adrianople, heading for the Danube. By June 1711, the Ottoman vanguard reached the Danube River, which marked the boundary between Ottoman-held Wallachia and Russian-occupied Moldavia. Field Marshal Sheremetev’s Russian advance guard was supposed to prevent the Ottomans from crossing the Danube (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). However, Ottoman vassal cavalry (the Tatars) continually harassed Sheremetev’s forces, and shortages of fodder and food hampered the Russians (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). Consequently, Baltacı Mehmet Pasha’s army crossed the Danube unopposed and entered Wallachia (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). The Wallachian prince Brâncoveanu now openly sided with the Ottomans, providing them guides and provisions as they traversed his territory (Moldavian Surprise 1711 – Balkan Military History). The stage was set for a confrontation in Moldavia, with the Ottomans advancing from the south and Peter’s army moving down the Prut from the north.
• Siege of Brăila (July 13–14, 1711): While the main Russian and Ottoman armies maneuvered, a significant side battle took place at Brăila, an important fortified port on the Danube. A Russian detachment under General Carl von Rönne, together with rebel Wallachian troops led by Toma Cantacuzino, struck at Brăila in mid-July (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). Brăila was an Ottoman-administered town (in Wallachia, but garrisoned by Ottoman troops). After a two-day siege (13–14 July 1711), the Russians and their Wallachian allies stormed and captured Brăila (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). This victory secured the Russian flank and disrupted Ottoman logistics, but it came too late to influence the main campaign on the Prut. (Notably, Prince Brâncoveanu had forbidden Wallachian forces from aiding the Russians; Cantacuzino’s defection to Peter’s side was an act of rebellion (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). This disobedience later fueled Ottoman suspicions about Wallachia’s ruler in the war’s aftermath.)

(image) A depiction of Tsar Peter the Great in his field tent on the Prut River, with Russian troops encamped around him (painting by Mikhail Ivanov). In July 1711, Peter’s army in Moldavia was surrounded by Ottoman forces near the Prut, leading to a tense standoff.

• Battle of Stănilești (Prut River Campaign, July 1711): The decisive encounter of the war occurred along the Prut River in modern-day Moldova and Romania. As Peter’s army marched southward, Ottoman and Tatar advance forces made contact on 18–19 July 1711. Peter had arrayed his combined Russian–Moldavian army on the right (north) bank of the Prut, near the village of Stănilești. Grand Vizier Baltacı’s army was on the opposite bank. On 19 July, swarms of Tatar light cavalry swam or ferried across the Prut, attacking the Russian advance guard (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). Behind them, Ottoman engineers rapidly threw up pontoon bridges, enabling the bulk of the Ottoman army to cross the river. Peter rushed forward with his main force to assist his vanguard, but the Russians were driven back by the fierce Ottoman attack (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). Realizing his danger, Peter ordered a withdrawal into a defensive camp near Stănilești. The Russians entrenched themselves in a wagenburg-style laager (field fortification) and formed a large defensive square with their wagons, cannons, and infantry lines (Moldavian Surprise 1711 – Balkan Military History) (Moldavian Surprise 1711 – Balkan Military History). By 20 July, the Ottomans had surrounded the Russian camp on all sides (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). The Ottomans pressed the attack to finish off the Russian host. Waves of Janissary infantry assaults were launched on the Russian entrenchments. Intense fighting raged for three days (20–22 July). The Russians and their Moldavian allies put up stiff resistance from behind earthworks and wagons, managing to repulse repeated Janissary charges – inflicting heavy losses on the Ottomans (contemporary accounts speak of some 8,000 Janissaries killed in these frontal attacks) (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). Prince Cantemir’s Moldavian troops, fighting alongside the Russians, also suffered in the fierce combat (Moldavian Surprise 1711 – Balkan Military History). Despite tactical success in defense, the Russians were in a dire situation: they were critically low on food and water. Ottoman cannon batteries (around 300 guns emplaced by the Grand Vizier (Moldavian Surprise 1711 – Balkan Military History)) bombarded the Russian camp day and night, making any escape or resupply impossible. Ottoman cavalry controlled the rear, so the Russians could not reach the Prut River to fetch water, nor could they break out without incurring devastating losses (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). By the night of 21 July, Peter’s army was exhausted, parched, and nearly out of gunpowder. With defeat and annihilation looming, the Tsar decided to seek terms from the Ottoman commander.
• Negotiation on the Prut: Tsar Peter, reportedly urged on by his wife Catherine and his generals, sued for peace. On 21–22 July, envoys shuttled between the Russian camp and the Grand Vizier’s headquarters. Grand Vizier Baltacı Mehmet Pasha, aware that he had the enemy trapped, nevertheless was inclined to be magnanimous – he too had reasons to end the fight. The Ottomans had taken significant casualties in their assaults, the summer heat and disease threatened his own troops, and there was intelligence (or rumors) that the Habsburg Austrian Empire might intervene if the war dragged on (Moldavian Surprise 1711 – Balkan Military History). Furthermore, Charles XII and the Crimean Khan (both present with the Ottoman army) urged Baltacı to capture Peter I alive or force an unconditional surrender, but the Vizier preferred a swift settlement rather than risking unforeseen setbacks (Moldavian Surprise 1711 – Balkan Military History) (Baltacı Mehmet Pasha – Wikipedia). On 22 July 1711, Peter the Great and Baltacı Mehmet Pasha agreed to a ceasefire and preliminary peace terms, ending the fighting (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). The encircled Russian army was thus spared from destruction. (Legend has it that Catherine gathered all her jewels and a sizeable bribe was delivered to the Grand Vizier to sweeten the deal – anecdotally, “two wheelbarrows” of gold and jewels – prompting him to soften the terms (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia) (Baltacı Mehmet Pasha – Wikipedia). While this story of bribery, mentioned by Voltaire and others, may be exaggerated, it became part of the lore of the Prut campaign. Regardless, the Vizier’s decision to negotiate likely also stemmed from pragmatic concerns about attrition and broader geopolitics.)

Strategies and Tactics of the Belligerents

Russian Strategy: Peter the Great’s strategy in 1711 was ambitious but risky. His goal was to force the Ottoman Empire into a quick and favorable peace, removing the threat to Russia’s southern flank so he could refocus on the war with Sweden. To achieve this, Russia adopted an offensive approach: Peter sought to strike deep into Ottoman territory (via Moldavia and Wallachia) to shock the Ottomans. He counted on the support of disaffected vassal states – allying with Moldavia and attempting to win over Wallachia – to bolster his forces and create internal problems for the Ottomans (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia) (Moldavian Surprise 1711 – Balkan Military History). The Russians marched rapidly from Ukraine into Moldavia, aiming to seize the initiative before the Ottomans could fully mobilize. Peter also opened secondary fronts to distract the Ottomans: in coordination with the main campaign, Russian forces attacked the Crimean Khanate from the north and east. A column of Russian troops (7,000 Russians and 20,000 Cossacks) under Hetman Skoropadsky and General Ivan Buturlin invaded Crimea in June 1711, while another force under Count P. M. Apraksin, with 13,000 Russians plus 20,000 allied Kalmyk cavalry, campaigned against the Crimean Tatars in the Kuban region (Crimean campaign (1711) – Wikipedia) (Kuban Campaign (1711) – Wikipedia). These moves were meant to tie down the Tatar cavalry and prevent them from reinforcing the Ottoman main army. Additionally, Admiral Fyodor Apraksin’s flotilla on the Black Sea threatened the Ottoman coastal strongholds and supported operations like the siege of Brăila. However, the Russian strategy suffered from logistical overstretch and poor intelligence. The marching army quickly ran low on provisions in the poor lands of Moldavia, and the anticipated Wallachian defection did not fully materialize. Peter also underestimated the speed and scale of the Ottoman mobilization. Thus, while the Russians achieved some tactical successes (e.g., capturing Brăila, ravaging the Crimean peninsula’s periphery), they ultimately found themselves overextended and encircled when the Ottomans concentrated superior forces at the Prut.

Ottoman Strategy: The Ottoman Empire’s approach combined prudent diplomacy with overwhelming force. Initially, Sultan Ahmed III had tried to avoid direct conflict, but once war was decided, the Ottomans moved swiftly to exploit their numerical and positional advantages. Grand Vizier Baltacı Mehmet Pasha’s plan was to encircle and annihilate the Russian army in Ottoman vassal territory. The Ottomans leveraged their control over the Danube River line – instead of waiting for the Russians to come deeper, they took the offensive and crossed into Moldavia to meet Peter’s invasion head-on (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). The Ottoman army was well-supplied and larger, and it included diverse contingents: besides imperial Ottoman troops (Janissaries, sipahi cavalry, artillery), there were Crimean Tatar hordes and even units from other vassals like Wallachia (Moldavian Surprise 1711 – Balkan Military History). A key Ottoman tactic was the use of Tatar cavalry for scorched-earth and harassment. As the Crimean Khan’s riders raided ahead of the main force, they devastated farms and food supplies that the Russians might use, and constantly attacked Russian foraging parties (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). This strategy successfully compounded the Russian army’s supply troubles. In battle, the Ottomans employed classic tactics of envelopment: at Stănilești, they fixed the Russians in place with frontal assaults while their cavalry swarmed around to cut off escape routes. The Ottoman command also remained open to negotiation when advantageous. Baltacı Mehmet Pasha was careful to secure primary Ottoman objectives – such as the return of Azov – through diplomacy once the military situation was favorable, rather than risking a desperate Russian breakout or potential intervention by Austria (Moldavian Surprise 1711 – Balkan Military History). In essence, the Ottoman leadership balanced aggression with pragmatism, using their superior manpower and cavalry mobility to corner the enemy, and then opting for a political victory once those military aims were met. This strategy yielded a swift win with minimal disruption to the empire’s core territories.

Outcome: The Treaty of Prut (1711)

With Peter’s army at the brink of collapse, peace talks on the Prut produced an agreement in short order. The Treaty of Prut was signed on 21 July 1711 (some sources say 22 July, as negotiations continued overnight). The terms of this treaty were surprisingly moderate given the Ottomans’ upper hand, yet they achieved the Sultan’s main aims. According to the treaty:

• Russia agreed to surrender the fortress of Azov (and its surrounding region) back to the Ottoman Empire (Baltacı Mehmet Pasha – Wikipedia). Azov, located on the Sea of Azov, had been captured by Peter the Great in 1696 and was Russia’s gateway to the Black Sea. Losing it meant Russia forfeited its foothold on the Black Sea coast – a significant setback to Peter’s naval ambitions in the south.
• Russia was required to demolish several fortresses built or occupied during its southern expansion, notably the newly constructed port of Taganrog on the Azov Sea, as well as fortifications at Buğaz and Kamyan (along the Dnieper) (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). These fortresses had threatened Ottoman and Tatar territories; their demolition ensured the neutralization of Russian military infrastructure on the Ottomans’ frontier.
• The Tsar pledged to cease interfering in the internal affairs of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth (Baltacı Mehmet Pasha – Wikipedia). This clause was important to the Ottomans, who were concerned about Russian influence expanding westward. (Peter had been intermittently involved in Polish affairs during the Great Northern War, supporting his ally King Augustus II against Swedish-backed Stanisław Leszczyński. Now, Russia temporarily renounced such meddling, aligning with the Ottomans’ interest in a stable, independent Poland as a buffer state.)
• Safe passage was guaranteed to King Charles XII of Sweden to return to his homeland (Baltacı Mehmet Pasha – Wikipedia). The Ottomans insisted that Charles – whose presence had triggered the conflict – be allowed to leave Ottoman territory unharmed. Russia agreed to this, effectively acknowledging Charles’s status. (In fact, Charles XII remained in the Ottoman Empire until 1714, trying to incite further Ottoman action; but under the treaty, Peter could not obstruct his return. Charles eventually departed for Sweden in 1714 after the Ottomans tired of hosting him.)
• Regarding prisoners and allies: The Ottomans demanded that Prince Cantemir of Moldavia be handed over to them, since from their perspective he was a traitor. Peter refused this request, reportedly claiming that Cantemir had slipped away (in reality, the prince was safely with the Russian camp) (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). Ultimately, Cantemir escaped with the Russians. The treaty otherwise allowed for an exchange of prisoners and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ottoman territory.

In essence, the Treaty of Prut ended the war in an Ottoman victory, but it was not a crushing defeat for Russia – it was more of a return to the status quo ante in many respects. Tsar Peter retained his army and his throne, but paid for his escape by relinquishing Azov and promising to refrain from southern entanglements (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). Grand Vizier Baltacı Mehmet Pasha was willing to let the Russian army go after extracting these concessions. The terms were later confirmed and formalized in the Treaty of Adrianople (Edirne) of 1713, wherein both empires reaffirmed the conditions of Prut and restored formal peace (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia).

From the Swedish perspective, the outcome was a disappointment – Charles XII had hoped for a harsher Russian defeat. Indeed, Charles and his Tatar ally Devlet Giray were furious that Peter was let off so lightly (Baltacı Mehmet Pasha – Wikipedia). But for the Ottoman Empire, the war’s end was satisfactory: their honor was upheld and previously lost ground (Azov) recovered, all at relatively low cost. For Russia, the treaty, while a humiliation, was a godsend in practical terms: it freed Peter to focus on the northern war against Sweden, having averted a potential disaster on the Prut.

Consequences for the Ottoman Empire and Russia

Territorial and Political Consequences for the Ottomans: The Prut War’s immediate territorial effect was the restoration of Azov to Ottoman control (Baltacı Mehmet Pasha – Wikipedia). By regaining Azov and demolishing Russia’s forts nearby, the Ottoman Empire re-secured its flank in the Black Sea region. This victory shored up Ottoman influence over the northern Black Sea coast and the Crimean Khanate. Another consequence was the Ottomans’ reinforced dominance over their vassal states, Moldavia and Wallachia. Both of these Danubian Principalities had shown unreliable loyalty during the conflict – Moldavia outright defected under Cantemir, and Wallachia’s prince had wavered (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). In response, the Ottoman government decided to tighten control over Moldavia and Wallachia. Sultan Ahmed III soon ended the rule of indigenous dynasties in those principalities. In late 1711, Moldavia’s throne was given to Nicholas Mavrocordatos, a Greek Phanariote loyal to Istanbul (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). Similarly, in 1716 the Ottomans replaced Wallachia’s Brâncoveanu dynasty with another Greek Phanariote ruler (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). This inaugurated the Phanariote era in both countries – a period of Greek governors appointed by the Sultan, ensuring closer Ottoman oversight. As for Prince Dimitrie Cantemir, he fled Moldavia with his family and a large retinue of boyars, taking refuge in Russia (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). Moldavia was left firmly under Ottoman punitive supervision.

In Wallachia, Prince Constantin Brâncoveanu initially survived the war but fell under heavy suspicion. The Ottomans learned that he had been in secret contact with Peter and had only reluctantly remained loyal. In 1714, Ahmed III’s mistrust culminated in Brâncoveanu’s arrest and execution in Constantinople, along with his four sons (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). This brutal display punished Wallachia’s perceived perfidy and warned other vassals against treason. Thus, one political consequence of the Prut War was a harsher Ottoman policy toward semi-autonomous border states – reducing their autonomy to prevent them from becoming gateways for Russian interference.

Militarily, the war was a short-term triumph for the Ottoman Empire. It demonstrated that the Ottomans could still defeat a major European power in the field, even in the 18th century. The news of victory at Prut was at first celebrated in Constantinople. However, the leniency of the peace terms soon sparked controversy in Ottoman ranks. A faction of officials and generals (the “war party”) argued that Baltacı Mehmet Pasha had squandered the chance to destroy the Russian army completely (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). They even accused the Grand Vizier of being bribed by Peter (via Catherine) into offering an easy peace (Baltacı Mehmet Pasha – Wikipedia). Whether or not bribes were actually given, this perception led to political fallout. Sultan Ahmed III, swayed by critics and by Charles XII’s complaints, dismissed Baltacı Mehmet Pasha from the grand vizierate in November 1711 (Baltacı Mehmet Pasha – Wikipedia). The once-lauded commander was exiled and died the next year. This showed the internal division in Ottoman policy circles: one group was content with the war’s gains, another felt they should have pressed for total victory (perhaps even marching on a weakened Russia).

In the two years following the treaty, the pro-war faction in Istanbul continued to agitate for a renewed war against Russia, partly egged on by the stranded Charles XII and Khan Devlet Giray (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). They alleged that Russia was slow to fulfill certain terms (like demolishing forts and fully withdrawing from Polish territory). Indeed, Sultan Ahmed III did declare war again in 1712 and 1713 under this pressure (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). However, these renewals of hostilities were mostly abortive: diplomatic maneuvering prevailed, and no major battles ensued as new peace accords quickly reestablished the Pax Ottomana (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). Eventually, Ahmed III grew weary of Charles XII’s schemes. In 1713, the Sultan decided to send the Swedish king home and deposed the intransigent Crimean Khan (Devlet II Giray) for his warmongering stance (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). By resolving these tensions, the Ottoman Empire effectively closed the chapter on the Prut conflict and turned its attention elsewhere (notably, Ahmed III would launch an offensive against Venice in 1714, leading to war with Austria by 1716).

Consequences for Russia: For Peter the Great’s Russia, the Prut War was a sobering setback, though not a fatal one. The immediate territorial consequence was the loss of Azov, which cut off Russia’s access to the Black Sea (Baltacı Mehmet Pasha – Wikipedia). Peter’s burgeoning Black Sea fleet, which he had started building at Taganrog, had to be destroyed as per the treaty (Moldavian Surprise 1711 – Balkan Military History). This was a blow to Peter’s naval and expansionist aspirations – effectively delaying Russian penetration southward. It would take another two decades (and further wars) before Russia could regain Azov and resume its push toward the Black Sea. In the short term, Russia’s influence in the Danube-Carpathian region was also curtailed: Peter lost the alliance of Moldavia (Cantemir’s principality now firmly back under Ottoman control) and had to put plans regarding Wallachia and the Balkans on hold. Moreover, Russia temporarily halted its interference in Poland as promised, which meant that for a few years Peter trod carefully in Polish-Lithuanian affairs.

Despite these setbacks, Russia emerged from the Prut War with some crucial advantages intact. First and foremost, Peter the Great and his army survived. This cannot be overstated: had Peter been killed or captured at Prut, Russia’s rise as a great power might have been dramatically stunted. One historian notes that if Baltacı Mehmet Pasha had taken Peter prisoner, Russia “would have hardly become an imperial power” in the subsequent decades (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). The preservation of the Tsar and his seasoned army meant Russia lived to fight another day. Indeed, freed from the southern threat, Peter immediately refocused on the Great Northern War, where his armies soon won decisive victories against Sweden. Within a decade, by 1721, Russia had defeated Sweden and secured the Baltic coast (Treaty of Nystad), elevating it to the status of a European great power. The failure of the Ottomans to eliminate the Russian army at Prut thus indirectly enabled Russia’s further success in Northern and Eastern Europe.

Internally, the Prut campaign taught Russia some valuable lessons. The debacle highlighted shortcomings in logistics and planning – Peter realized that inadequate supplies and overextension nearly doomed his forces. In the aftermath, he took steps to improve supply lines and avoid such errors in future campaigns. Politically, Peter spun the narrow escape at Prut as a kind of miraculous deliverance, and he rewarded those who had contributed. His wife Catherine in particular earned acclaim; legend holds that because of her level-headed counsel (and rumored role in bribing the Ottomans), Peter later crowned her Empress (Catherine became co-ruler in 1724 and succeeded Peter after his death). For Prince Cantemir and the Moldavian boyar nobles who fled with him, Russia became a new home. Peter integrated these exiled nobles into Russian service – Cantemir himself settled in Russia, received a title of Prince of the Russian Empire, and became an important scholar and advisor to the Tsar. This was an early example of Russia positioning itself as the protector of Orthodox Christians from Ottoman lands, a theme that would recur in future conflicts.

Militarily, while Russia had lost on the battlefield, there was a small silver lining: on the peripheral fronts (Crimea and Kuban), Russian forces had shown they could hold their own. The Crimea incursion was unsuccessful, but the Kuban campaign of 1711 saw Russian and Kalmyk units defeat Tatar forces in several skirmishes (Kuban Campaign (1711) – Wikipedia). Though these victories had no impact on the war’s outcome, later Russian military historians noted them as the first signs that Russia could project power against the once-invincible Crimean Tatars (Kuban Campaign (1711) – Wikipedia). Still, the dominant feeling in Russia after 1711 was relief rather than triumph. Tsar Peter had to swallow his pride and concede territory to extricate himself. In correspondence, he admitted the Prut fiasco was a chastisement for his overconfidence. Going forward, Russia remained wary of the Ottomans, avoiding open conflict with them for the next two decades (until a new war in 1735, when circumstances were more favorable).

Broader Implications for Eastern European Geopolitics

The Prut War of 1710–1711 had consequences that rippled through Eastern European geopolitics in the early 18th century. In many ways, it reaffirmed the division of influence in Eastern Europe between the Ottoman Empire and the rising Russian Empire. Each power gained a renewed appreciation of the other’s strength. The Ottoman victory at Prut demonstrated that the Ottomans were still a force to be reckoned with in the region (Moldavian Surprise 1711 – Balkan Military History), even after a period of relative stagnation following the 17th-century Holy League wars. This outcome checked – for the time being – Russia’s southward expansion. The Black Sea remained effectively an Ottoman lake for several more decades, and the Danubian Principalities stayed under firm Ottoman suzerainty. European contemporaries, who had begun to see Russia as unstoppable after Poltava, were reminded that the Ottoman military could still halt a great European monarch. This maintained a balance of power in Eastern Europe: Russia would dominate the north (the Baltic and Poland) while the Ottomans dominated the southeast (Balkans and Black Sea), with the vast expanse of the Ukrainian steppes and the Polish Commonwealth lying in between as a buffer.

The war also influenced the fate of intermediary states and peoples. Moldavia and Wallachia experienced a significant shift – the imposition of Phanariote rulers tethered them more tightly to Ottoman policies (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia). This curtailed their autonomy and altered the social-political landscape of those principalities, which would persist until the 19th century. The Orthodox boyar classes in those lands became increasingly oriented either toward the Ottoman-Greek milieu or looked to Russia as a potential liberator in the longer term. Indeed, the flight of Cantemir and his followers to Russia was an early sign of Russian cultural and political influence spreading among Balkan elites.

For the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Treaty of Prut had a short-term stabilizing effect. Russia’s promise to stay out of Polish affairs gave the war-weary Commonwealth a brief respite from great-power interference. (In practice, this respite was short-lived; by 1715 Russia was again meddling in Polish internal matters. But the Ottomans had made a point that the Commonwealth was under their diplomatic watch, which somewhat shielded Poland at that moment.) More broadly, Sweden’s failure to draw the Ottomans further into the Great Northern War meant that Charles XII’s hopes for a two-front war against Peter were dashed. The Prut War thus indirectly ensured that the Great Northern War remained confined to Northern and Central Europe, allowing Russia to eventually triumph over Sweden.

Geopolitically, the cautious peace achieved at Prut helped prevent a wider European war in 1711. The Habsburg Empire, though not involved in the Prut War, was monitoring it closely. Had the Ottomans utterly destroyed the Russian army or pushed further north, the Austrian Habsburgs might have intervened (as Grand Vizier Baltacı reportedly feared) (Moldavian Surprise 1711 – Balkan Military History). By settling for limited gains, the Ottomans avoided provoking Austria at that time. Ironically, only a few years later the Ottomans went to war against Austria (in 1716) on their own terms, but in 1711 the moderation at Prut localized the conflict. This meant that Eastern Europe did not become entangled in the larger War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714) which was raging in Western Europe concurrently. Each theater remained separate, which was a relief to statesmen who feared a general conflagration.

In the grand scheme, the Prut War was the first of several 18th-century Russo-Ottoman confrontations. It set a pattern where initial Ottoman successes would later be followed by Russian resurgence. Though the Ottomans emerged victorious in 1711, some Ottoman commentators later lamented that the opportunity to cripple Russia was missed. Conversely, Russian rulers and strategists took to heart the lesson that the Ottoman Empire was a rival that needed careful approach and better preparation. The rivalry for influence in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea continued, intensifying later in the century. But in 1711, the outcome maintained a certain equilibrium.

In summary, the Prut War of 1710–1711 was a brief but pivotal episode that halted Peter the Great’s first push toward the Black Sea, restored Ottoman confidence (albeit briefly), and reshaped the governance of two key Black Sea principalities. It allowed Russia to consolidate its gains in the Baltic region while the Ottomans consolidated their hold on the Danube frontier. The war’s resolution by diplomacy rather than a fight to the finish spared both empires an uncertain, prolonged conflict. Each side walked away claiming partial success – the Ottomans with territorial and diplomatic wins, and the Russians with their core power intact. The broader Eastern European geopolitical order, therefore, experienced an adjustment but not a revolution: Ottoman and Russian spheres of influence were more clearly delineated, setting the stage for their 18th-century power struggle that would eventually determine the fate of Eastern Europe.

Sources:

1. Alexander Mikaberidze, Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World: A Historical Encyclopedia, Vol. 1 (2011) – on the significance of Baltacı Mehmet Pasha’s decision (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia).
2. Nicolae Iorga, A History of the Crusades, Vol. V (edited by Harry W. Hazard, 1969) – details on Moldavia and Wallachia under Ottoman rule post-1711 (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia) (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia).
3. Wikipedia: Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia) (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia) (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia) (Russo-Turkish War (1710–1713) – Wikipedia); Baltacı Mehmet Pasha (Baltacı Mehmet Pasha – Wikipedia) (Baltacı Mehmet Pasha – Wikipedia) (Baltacı Mehmet Pasha – Wikipedia); Crimean campaign (1711) (Crimean campaign (1711) – Wikipedia) (Crimean campaign (1711) – Wikipedia). (Accessed April 20, 2025)
4. David Alan Black, “Moldavian Surprise 1711,” Balkan Military History (2010) – wargame research summary of the Prut Campaign (Moldavian Surprise 1711 – Balkan Military History) (Moldavian Surprise 1711 – Balkan Military History) (Moldavian Surprise 1711 – Balkan Military History).
5. Walter Moss, A History of Russia to 1855 (Volume 1, 2002) – context on Peter the Great’s foreign wars (Crimean campaign (1711) – Wikipedia) (Crimean campaign (1711) – Wikipedia).